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A THEORETICAL EXPLORATION OF THE ADOPTION AND DESIGN OF
FLEXIBLE BENEFIT PLANS :  A CASE OF HUMAN RESOURCE
INNOVATION
ABSTRACT
This article explores theoretical explanations of managers’ decisions about flexible benefit plans.
We (1) examine the adoption and design of flexible benefit plans through four theoretic lenses:
institutional, resource dependence, agency, and transaction costs; (2) integrate the relevant
insights gained from these theories into a more complete model and derive propositions for future
research; and (3) generalize the insights gained from exploring a specific innovation to broader
questions surrounding decisions about other human resource innovations.
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In the early 1970s, only a handful of companies offered flexible benefit plans.  Today it is
estimated that one-third of organizations with more than 1,000 employees offer flexible benefits
(Hewitt, 1995).  The early plans were relatively simple, offering few choices and limited flexibility.
Current approaches range from simply offering pretax salary reductions to pay for benefits, to highly
complex plans that offer many options.
Beyond surveys of firm practices, these developments have received little scholarly
attention.  Very little research has been addressed to understanding why some firms adopt and
others do not, or why some plans offer more choices than others. Virtually nothing is known about
why the variety of these plans has increased over time.  What objectives are achieved?  How do
employees’ attitudes, competitors’ practices, rising benefit costs and shifting regulatory conditions
affect management’s decisions?1
Our purpose is to explore the insights offered by organization theories and research.
Specifically, we (1) examine management’s adoption and design decisions through four theoretic
lenses:  institutional, resource dependence, agency, and transaction costs; (2) integrate the insights
gained from these theories and related research into a more complete model, with testable
propositions for future empirical work; and (3) generalize these insights to other human resource
innovations.
The principal contributions of our article are threefold:  First, by integrating the insights of
multiple theoretical perspectives, we offer a more parsimonious model of management’s decisions
about flexible benefits and a set of testable propositions that can guide much-needed research.
None of the four theories considered here includes the full set of variables that may affect
management’s decisions about employee benefits.  Each theory offers unique insights, however
there is also some overlap.  Second, our model and analysis offer a platform for understanding why
organizations adopt other HR innovations.  Finally, we bring together a diverse body of literature on
flexible benefit plans around theoretic perspectives.  Currently, the literature is largely segmented
into benefits administration, survey evidence, and academic research.
To accomplish the article’s three objectives, we first describe flexible benefit plans and
review the related literature and research.  Next, we present a brief overview of the four theories
and highlight their relevance to flexible benefits decisions.  Following this overview, we offer our
integrated model based on specific insights gained from these theories and derive testable
propositions.  We conclude by discussing the potential to generalize our ideas to other human
resource innovations.
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FLEXIBLE BENEFIT PLANS
Flexible Benefit Plans Defined
Definitions of benefits vary considerably.  The narrowest definition includes only those
benefits not underwritten or paid for by the government, such as health insurance or private
pensions (Beam & McFadden, 1996).  Broader definitions include “virtually any form of
compensation other than direct wages paid to employees” (Ros nbloom, 1996: 3) and encompass
benefits that range from commonly observed retirement and insurance plans to unique offerings
such as spiritual counseling or fruit from the orchard (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1995).
Definitions of flexible benefit plans are less ambiguous, and the list of forms that are
included in such plans more narrow.  In general, any plan that allows employees to make choices
about the benefits that they receive is considered to be a flexible benefit, or cafeteria, plan (Beam &
McFadden, 1996; Rosenbloom, 1996).  For the purposes of this article, we use the definition set out
in Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Specifically, we define flexible benefit plans as those
that offer employees a choice between qualified (nontaxable) benefits and cash (Beam &
McFadden, 1996).  A plan that does not offer a cash option, for example a plan that simply offers a
choice of medical plans, would not be considered a flexible benefit plan under this definition,
whereas a plan that offers the option of paying for a (qualified, nontaxable) benefit with pre-tax
wages (cash) would (Borleis, 1996).
Although the options that can be included in a flexible benefit plan are somewhat limited, the
plans incorporate a variety of different designs, ranging in the amount of flexibility (choice) and the
costs to the employer.  We include four general types of designs that are consistent with the IRS
definition adopted for use in this article: salary-reduction-only, modular options, core plus options,
and mix and match.  The four plan designs are summarized in Table 1 (Employee Benefit Research
Institute, 1991; Beam & McFadden, 1996).  As the table shows, costs to the employer increase as
the amount of flexibility increases (Beam & McFadden, 1996).  Hence, costs and flexibility are
lowest under the “salary-reduction-only” design and highest under “mix and match."
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TABLE 1: Flexible Benefit Plans
Low flexibility High flexibility
ß------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------à
Low cost High cost
Salary-reduction-only Modular Options Core + Optional Coverage Mix & Match
Premium conversion:
Employee pays premium for
insurance with pre-tax salary
reduction
Flexible spending account:
Pre-tax salary reduction fund
an account for paying
uncovered medical or
dependent care bills
Choice between several
different combinations of
benefits (usually same types
of benefits but different levels
of benefits)
Core:  Basic coverage in
certain areas (e.g., health, life
and/or disability insurance)
Plus:  Flexible credits to
purchase additional coverage
in core area or in
supplemental areas such as
child care, vacation days, or
trade in for cash
Flexible credits are provided,
and employee can purchase
any type and level of coverage
offered
Notes:
Flexible spending accounts (FSAs) may be included in any of the plans described above.
Medical plan options may include multiple types (HMOs, fee-for-service) and levels (e.g., high/medium/low deductible and co-
insurance rates), or they may be limited to a choice between a single fee-for-service plan and an HMO.
The Appeal of Flexible Benefit Plans
Flexible benefit plans represent a substantial departure from a traditional, one-size-fits-all
philosophy, where managers made decisions about the type and level of benefits employees would
receive and all employees were covered by the same benefits.  First introduced in the early 1970s,
this innovative practice did not start to gain popularity until the mid-1980s (Hewitt, 1995).  The
number of adoptions increased by 127% between 1983 and 1984, and has continued to increase
steadily, although the rate has slowed since 1989.  Currently, about 70% of firms that offer flexible
benefit plans are in the service industry (Hewitt, 1995).  The simpler, low flexibility type of design
(salary-reduction-only) seems to be the most widely used, although the incidence of the highly
flexible plans seems to be increasing (Hewitt, 1995; Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1995).
Managers most frequently cite two objectives in their decisions to adopt flexible benefit
plans:  (1) to enhance their employees’ benefits satisfaction; or (2) to help contain rising benefits
costs (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1995).  The premise underlying the first objective is
that as the diversity of the workforce has increased, so too has the diversity of employees’ benefits
needs.  Allowing employees to select a package that meets their individual needs has increasing
appeal.  In addition, flexible benefit plans hold the promise of containing costs by moving from a
defined benefit (in which a certain package of benefits is promised, regardless of cost) to a defined
contribution (in which a certain level of benefits expenditures is promised, regardless of what the
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funds can purchase) (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1991).  Further, by increasing choices
and skillfully pricing the options, organizations could encourage employees to select more cost-
effective benefit forms (Barringer & Mitchell, 1994; Barringer & Milkovich, 1996; Borleis, 1996).
The benefits management literature attributes the impetus for adopting flexible benefit plans
to cost pressures and the increasing diversity of the workforce as well, but also cites changing tax
regulations (Borleis, 1996; Beam & McFadden, 1996).  Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code,
for example, permitted the use of flexible spending accounts to pay for medical or dependent care
expenses, and eliminated the tax penalties for plans offering both taxable and non-taxable benefits.
The merits of flexible benefit plans are also espoused in the academic literature.  Over
twenty-five years ago, Lawler wrote that by heightening employees’ awareness of benefit costs and
ensuring that they receive the benefits they want, flexible benefit plans increase the perceived value
of their pay.  Drawing upon expectancy theory, he argued that flexible plans should reduce turnover
and enhance attraction, because they increase the perceived value to employees of working for
organizations that offered the plans (Lawler, 1971).  More recently, he argued that the workforce
has been changing in a number of ways (e.g., increasing diversity, less acceptance of traditional
authority, changing family structures) that make flexible plans attractive to a substantial portion of
employees and “potentially effective in most organizations” (Lawler, 1981: 76)
If carried to its logical conclusion, the satisfaction premise implies that organizations whose
success is tied to their capacity to attract and retain qualified employees would have a strong
reason to adopt flexible benefit plans.  Yet few researchers have examined this basic premise.  We
found only three studies that directly analyze the effects of flexible benefits on employee attitudes
and behaviors.  Two -- case studies of single firms -- found that the adoption of flexible benefit plans
was related to improved job satisfaction and lowered intentions to leave (Barber, et al., 1992;
Heshizer, 1994).  A third study examined the pay system preferences of graduating college
students and found that an organization’s attractiveness was significantly related to the presence of
flexible benefits (Cable & Judge, 1994).
Explaining Variation in Decisions about the Adoption and Design of Flexible Benefit Plans
The high costs of plan design and implementation, ever-changing regulations, paternalistic
concerns about employees' capacity to make sound decisions, and actuarial concerns about
disproportionate participation rates among options (adverse selection) have been offered as
reasons why more organizations have not implemented flexible benefits (Bloom & Trahan, 1986;
Beam & McFadden, 1996).  That some organizations are deterred by these obstacles and others
are not suggests that decisions about the plans are also affected by contextual factors.
A Theoretical Exploration WP 97-22
Page 7
To better understand these factors, we turn next to explore the insights offered by
organizational theories.  We selected four theories: institutional, resource dependence, agency, and
transaction cost.  Our selections were based on two related criteria.  First, we consider benefit plans
to be attributes of organizations, akin to other organization processes and structures such as
information systems, organization design, or hierarchical arrangements.  The organization is the
basic unit of analysis.  Consequently, we did not include theories such as expectancy and
procedural justice, because they tend to focus on the individual as the unit of analysis.  Agency
theory also focuses on individuals, however the unit of analysis is the contract between principals
and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Second, we selected theories that have already been useful in
offering explanations of other pay and benefits practices.  Eisenhardt (1988) found that both the
agency and institutional models partially described variation in the pay policies for salespersons at
retail stores.  Similarly, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) showed that the resource dependence
perspective helped explain variation in the wages paid to university administrators.  Goodstein
(1994), and Ingram and Simons (1995), applied the resource dependence and institutional models
to explain organizations’ work-family practices.  Williamson (1981) suggested that management’s
decisions about pensions may be related to transaction costs.
CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY:  A REVIEW AND COMPARISON
In this section we describe and analyze the four relevant theories.  The results are
summarized in Table 2, which contrasts the basic premises, key assumptions, implications and
limitations of the institutional, resource dependence, agency and transaction models.  Based on this
analysis, we then derive a model that integrates the insights gained.
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TABLE 2: Theoretical Premises and Implications for Flexible Benefit Plans
Institutional Resource
Dependence
Agency Transaction Cost
Basic Premise Organizational structures are
shaped by institutional
environments.
Organizational
structures are shaped
by agents who control
critical resources.
Organizational
structures are
established to manage
agency problems.
Organizational structures
are established to
minimize transaction
costs.
Key Assumptions Legitimacy is paramount.
External pressures constrain
decisions.
Organizations do not exercise
active choice.
Resource acquisition is
paramount.
External and/or internal
agents constrain
decisions.
Organizations exercise
active choice.
Efficiency is
paramount.
Information
asymmetries and
partial goal conflict
constrain decisions.
Organizations exercise
active choice.
Agents are risk-averse
and self-interested.
Efficiency is paramount.
Information asymmetries,
partial goal conflict, and
asset specificity constrain
decisions.
Organizations exercise
active choice.
Some people have a
propensity to behave
opportunistically.
Key Predictors Early:  Benefits objectives,
employee preferences, cost of
current (non-flex) benefits,
flexible plan costs
Late:  Competitors’ practices,
union density, legislation,
uncertainty,
interconnectedness
Extent of unionization
in external labor
markets.
Dependence on critical
employees.
Outcome uncertainty.
Observability and
measurability of
performance.
Human asset specificity.
Observability and
measurability of
performance.
Major
Predictions:
Organizations
Most Likely to
Adopt Flex Plans
Early:  Employees value
choice, costs of current
(non-flex) benefits are high,
or costs of flexible plan
implementation are
affordable.
Late:  Current legislation
favors flexibility.  Union
density is low.  Flexible
plans are prevalent in the
industry and uncertainty or
interconnectedness is high.
Labor market is highly
unionized.  Employees
are non-unionized,
have a high degree of
control over critical
resources and value
benefit flexibility.
Outcome uncertainty is
high, monitoring
productivity is difficult
(monitoring costs are
high), and employees
value benefit flexibility.
Critical skills are
organization-specific,
productivity is difficulty to
monitor, and employees
value benefit flexibility.
Major
Predictions:
Organizations
Most Likely to
Design Highly
Flexible Plans
Early:  Flexible plan
objectives emphasize
benefits satisfaction.
Late: Current legislation
favors flexible options.  High
flexibility is prevalent in the
field and uncertainty or
interconnectedness is high.
Employees have high
degree of control over
critical resources.
Outcome uncertainty
and monitoring costs
are high.
Critical skills are
organization-specific and
productivity is difficulty to
monitor.
Limitations Neglects the role of interest
and agency.
Focuses on conformity.
Neglects the role of
agency and transaction
costs.
Offers limited
explanation of adoption
decisions.
Neglects the social
context.
Offers limited
explanation of adoption
decisions.
Neglects the social
context.
Offers limited explanation
of adoption decisions.
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Institutional Theory
As noted in Table 2, the institutional perspective posits that organizations will adopt an
innovation, even if technically inefficient, in order to gain legitimacy, and hence the resources
necessary to ensure their survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker,
1987).  Practices may be adopted voluntarily, in response to pressures to conform to accepted
standards of practice; or involuntarily, in response to coercion by powerful institutional forces that
control critical resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).
Proponents of this theory distinguish between early, or pre-institutional, adopters, who introduce an
innovation based on its capacity to improve organizational performance; and later adopters, who,
when the practice has become semi- or fully institutionalized, are more likely to behave according to
prevailing practice (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).
The capacity of the institutional model to help explain variation in organizational structures is
supported by several studies, including several that examined innovative pay and benefit practices
(see, e.g., Scott, 1987; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, for reviews of this
literature).  The theory has been used to explain organizations’ family-friendly policies (Goodstein,
1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995; Osterman, 1995); child care (Kossek, Dass & DeMarr, 1994);
executive compensation (Westphal & Zajac, 1994); and the compensation of retail sales personnel
(Eisenhardt, 1988).  Nevertheless, institutional theory does not fully explain variations in these
practices and structures.  Critics note that it fails to take into account the importance of the
organizations’ strategic goals and self-interests (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991).  The institutional
model seems to provide fuller explanations of organizational structures when integrated with other
theories.  Researchers have integrated the insights offered by the institutional model with those
offered by resource dependence (Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995), agency
(Eisenhardt, 1988), and transaction cost (Pouder, 1996; Roberts & Greenwood, 1997).  We are
aware of no research that has attempted a comprehensive integration of the unique insights offered
by the four theories.
The resource dependence, agency and transaction cost perspectives all suggest that
expectations about efficiency drive decisions about structures such as flexible benefit plans.
Further, as Table 2 indicates, the models share some key variables and assumptions.  Yet each
focuses on different types of efficiency gains, thereby offering unique insights into the factors
affecting management’s decisions about flexible benefit plans.  For the purposes of this article, we
grouped the three theories into one category focusing on expected efficiency gains.
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Expected Efficiency Gains
Resource dependence theory.  Table 2 notes that the resource dependence model
assumes that management’s decisions are heavily influenced by internal and external agents who
control critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Internally, certain positions or employee
groups that control critical resources can theoretically impose preferred structures on their
organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Balkin & Bannister (1993) argued that employees holding
critical jobs in an organization can influence decisions about forms of pay (salary, incentives,
benefits, etc.).  High pay and attractive benefits can also attract and retain individuals who have the
greatest ability to obtain critical resources (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987).
External agents may control funds (e.g., government contracting agencies) or personnel
(e.g., unions), and can exert pressure on an organization to adopt certain structures by linking
compliance with resource allocation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981).  These external
pressures bear a remarkable resemblance to the institutional model’s “coercive pressures,” and
distinguishing between the two models’ explanations of organizations’ structures can therefore be
difficult (Zucker, 1987; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  As Oliver (1991) and others point out, however, the
resource dependence model views organizations as responding more strategically, or
autonomously, to external pressures than does the institutional model.  Hence, whereas both
models consider external pressures, the resource dependence model also considers characteristics
of the organizations that affect the extent to which decision-makers actively manage the pressures
versus passively comply with them (Oliver, 1991; Greening & Gray, 1994).  Goodstein (1994) for
example, found that resistance to pressures to adopt family-friendly policies varied with the percent
of women in the organization’s workforce.
Resource dependence-based explanations of organizational structures have generally been
supported by empirical research.  Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) found that pay level decisions for
employees occupying the same position in different organizations could be partially explained by
differences in the role the position plays in the acquisition of monetary resources.  As noted above,
a number of studies have successfully integrated the resource dependence and institutional models
to partially explain a variety of organizational practices, including benefits.
Agency theory.  The focus of the agency model is on the design of optimal employment
contracts.  The model’s premise is that the interests of principals may partially conflict with those of
the agents, and that compensation packages should be designed to motivate employees to act in
the best interests of the principal (Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Outcome-based
contracts provide powerful incentives for agents to be as productive as possible, but where
outcomes are uncertain, agents will demand higher pay to offset attendant risk.  Behavior-based
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contracts shift the risks to the presumably risk-neutral principal, but where information about agent
effort is difficult to obtain, incentives for agents to work in the best interests of the principal are
weak.  Where outcome uncertainty is high, and monitoring employee productivity is difficult or
costly, optimal contracts are more difficult to design.  A possible solution to this dilemma is to pay
so-called “efficiency wages,” i.e. wages that are above the market-clearing rate (Nalbantian, 1987;
Stiglitz, 1987).  Paying these higher wages creates an incentive for employees to work at least hard
enough to keep their jobs.  At the same time, their pay is not dependent upon the outcomes of their
efforts, which can be affected by factors other than employee effort.
We suggest that the agency and efficiency wage concept, which has most frequently been
applied to issues of direct pay, can be extended to total compensation (pay plus benefits).  Base
pay and benefits that are not tied to performance are generally considered to have a weak or
indirect impact on motivation (i.e., through promotions).  This premise suggests that base pay and
benefits are tied to continued employment, and if high enough will induce employees to work at
least hard enough to keep their jobs (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984).  A similar argument is made by
Shepard, Clifton and Kruse (1996), who applied the efficiency wage theory to explanations of
decisions to adopt flexible work hours.  The authors argued that employees who value flextime will
prefer to work in organizations that provide it, and will work hard enough to keep such employment
because the cost of being fired (and losing flextime) is high (Shepard et al., 1996).
A large body of research explores the implications of agency theory for employee
compensation (see Eisenhardt, 1989 for a review).  In general, these studies support the agency
model.  Once again, many of the studies use both agency and companion theories to examine
research hypotheses, an approach supported by Eisenhardt (1989: 71), who argued that agency
theory “presents a partial view of the world that,” although valid, “also ignores a good bit of the
complexity of organizations.”  Specifically, agency theory tends to over emphasize efficiency
explanations of organizational structures and neglect the institutional context in which they are
established (Kalleberg & Reve, 1993; Nilakant & Rao, 1994).
Transaction cost.  This perspective assumes that organizations establish structures that
minimize the costs of their transactions (the exchange of goods or services) with other parties when
the potential for opportunistic behavior is high (Williamson, 1981).  In the case of human resource
transactions, the potential for opportunistic behavior is related to two important “human asset”
characteristics:  First, where critical skills specific to the organization are acquired primarily on the
job, turnover can be costly, and internal governance structures are adopted to stabilize
employment.  Second, where individual productivity is difficult to monitor, governance structures are
adopted to provide incentives for employees to act in the organization’s interests (Williamson, 1981:
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564).  To the extent that employees value flexible benefits, adopting the plans would increase the
value of continued employment, hence reducing voluntary turnover and shirking.
Transaction cost explanations of organizational structures have for the most part been
supported by research (see Klein & Shelanski, 1994 for a review).  Much of the work has focused
on vertical integration, however the model has also been used to explain a variety of governance
issues (Klein & Shelanski, 1994).  Williamson (1981) argued that transaction costs can also explain
the adoption and design of specific human resource practices (such as flexible benefits), yet
empirical evidence in this area is limited.  One study found that the extent of transaction costs such
as firm-specific training can help explain the adoption of contingent work arrangements (Davis-
Blake & Uzzi, 1993).  In response to criticism that the model neglects contextual variables such as
power and institutional pressures, recent research has combined transaction cost explanations with
other perspectives, most notably institutional theory (Pouder, 1996; Roberts & Greenwood, 1997).
Summary:  Sources of Convergence and Divergence
As Table 2 illustrates, there is both convergence and divergence in the insights offered by
the individual theories.  The potential for integrating the four theories without creating redundancy
and incongruity may therefore seem limited.  Yet a recurring theme in the empirical literature is that
richer explanations of organizational structures can be derived by integrating the insights of multiple
theoretical perspectives.  Oliver (1991) argued that convergence demonstrates the potential for
integrating complementary explanations of organizational structures into a single model.  Further,
divergence “highlights the underlying assumptions about organizational behavior” that re not
acknowledged by a single theory and demonstrates the value of integrating multiple theories
(Oliver, 1991: 146).
Whereas all four perspectives assume that management’s decisions about structures are
constrained by environmental conditions, they differ in their assumptions about the nature of those
constraints.  External pressures are assumed to be the primary source of influence on decisions
under the institutional model, whereas internal conditions related to the nature of the work constitute
the primary constraints under the agency and transaction cost models.  The resource dependence
model assumes that internal andexternal agents impose constraints on decisions about structures.
Further, both the agency and transaction cost models assume that constraints arise as a result of
goal conflict, information asymmetries, and the tendency of people to act in their own self-interest.
Differences in assumptions about organizations’ responses to environmental constraints, as
noted in Table 2, are perhaps the most striking.  Organizational interest and agency are assumed to
play an important role in determining these responses under the resource dependence, agency and
transaction cost models. These “rational” models all assume that organizations actively manage
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environmental constraints, adopting structures that ensure the flow of resources, or minimize
agency or transaction costs.  Hence, the primary source of influence on management’s decisions
under these perspectives is what we refer to as expected efficiency gains.  The institutional model,
on the other hand, assumes that organizations do not exercise active choice; rather, they more
passively conform to their environments.  Organizations theoretically adopt structures that enhance
their legitimacy in the external environment, regardless of the impact on the technical efficiency of
internal operations.  Thus, institutional pressures are the primary source of influence on
management’s decisions about structures such as flexible benefits.
We argue that the integration of the four theoretical perspectives is not only feasible but
necessary to understand decisions about flexible benefit plans.  All of the theories seem to offer
insights, yet none offers a full explanation.  Institutional theory has been criticized for ignoring the
role of organizational interest and agency (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991).  The agency and
transaction cost models, on the other hand, have been criticized for ov remphasizing efficiency and
ignoring social context variables (Ei enhardt, 1989; Kalleberg & Reve, 1993; Nilakant & Rao, 1994).
Further, although the resource dependence, agency and transaction cost models all suggest that
expected efficiency gains drive decisions, each focuses on different types of gains.  In response to
these criticisms, researchers have integrated different combinations of the theories.  We are aware
of no research that has attempted to integrate the unique and tenable insights of all four models.
Accordingly, we take the logical next step and propose a model for explaining management’s
decisions about the adoption and design of flexible benefit plans that integrates the insights of the
institutional, resource dependence, agency and transaction cost theories.
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO EXPLAINING THE ADOPTION
 AND DESIGN OF FLEXIBLE BENEFITS
As depicted in Figure 1, management’s decisions about flexible benefits are hypothesized
as primarily influenced by two factors:  institutional pressures and expected efficiency gains.  These
two factors provide the framework for our discussion of the model.  First, we examine the
theoretical premises underlying each of the factors.  We identify antecedent variables that are likely
to shape the strength and direction of each factor’s effects on management’s decisions about the
adoption and design of the plans, and develop testable propositions.  Second, we examine
variables that affect the relative strength of the two primary factors, again developing a set of
related propositions.
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Institutional Pressures
The institutional model suggests that internal decisions about structures are heavily
influenced by pressures in the external environment (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995).
Below we outline the ways in which institutional pressures to conform to practices such as flexible
benefits are theoretically generated.
Antecedents of institutional pressures:  Competitors’ practices.  As a practice
becomes more diffused, it is increasingly viewed as standard, or best, practice, theoretically tying
the organization’s legitimacy and ability to obtain resources to compliance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  Hence, as the portion of competitors in an organization’s field or industry
adopting a flexible benefit plan, or a particular plan design, increases, the strength of the pressures
to adopt the plan also increases.  The pressures to adopt should be greater in the health care
industry, for example, where over two-thirds of organizations offer flexible benefits, than in
manufacturing, where the incidence is lower.  Similarly, the pressures to include a flexible spending
account in the plan should be highest in the services industry, where the incidence of the accounts
is highest.  Thus,
Proposition 1a:  The rate of new flexible benefit plan adoptions will be higher in industries in
which the portion of organizations offering the plans is high, than in industries in which the
portion is low.
Proposition 1b:  Organizations implementing a new flexible benefit plan are likely to match
the plan design (e.g., Core + Optional Coverage or Mix and Match) most commonly used in
their field or industry.
Antecedents of institutional pressures:  Coercive forces.  Institutional pressures that
are more coercive in nature may be generated by external agents who control critical resources and
have the power to impose preferred structures on an organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott,
1987; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  Our model suggests that unions may exert such pressures.
Powerful unions that control the supply of labor should theoretically be able to influence
management’s decisions about benefits practices.  Unions tend to view flexible benefit plans with
disfavor -- primarily because of the concomitant reductions in employer benefits that often occur,
and because the resultant lack of uniformity in benefits is counter to the unions’ egalitarian
philosophy and makes contract negotiations more difficult (Mulcahy, 1990; Employee Benefit
Research Institute, 1991; Wiatrowski, 1994).  The resource dependence model suggests, however,
that the strength of these pressures will depend on the importance of the resources and the extent
to which they can be obtained from other sources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981; Meznar
& Nigh, 1995).  Hence, coercive pressures are likely to be strongest in highly unionized and labor-
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intensive sectors, where human resources represent critical inputs to production and the power of
unions to withhold or supply labor is high.  Close to half of the workers in the labor-intensive public
sector, for example, are union members, suggesting high union control over critical resources
(Freeman, 1996).  We predict that,
Proposition 2:  The rate of new flexible benefit plan adoptions will be lower in highly
unionized, labor-intensive organizations than in organizations where the degree of
unionization is low.
Government agencies may also exert coercive pressure on organizations to adopt preferred
structures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Restrictions on employee compensation, for example, can
be imposed on organizations that have federal contracts.  We are aware of no such contingencies
related to flexible benefits.  The government has, however, passed legislation over the past 20
years that has variously encouraged or discouraged adoption of the plans.  Prior to 1978, the
federal tax code discouraged conventional flexible benefit plans, i.e. plans in which employees
could choose between taxable and nontaxable benefits.  The “doctrine of constructive receipt”
essentially increased the costs of such plans by requiring that employees’ taxable income be
calculated as if they had received the maximum amount of taxable benefits available, regardless of
their actual selections (Beam & McFadden, 1996).  The Revenue Act of 1978 ended the application
of this doctrine to flexible benefit plans, thus restoring favorable tax treatment.  Other laws, although
not specifically addressed to flexible benefits, may have had the effect of pushing organizations to
build more flexibility into their benefit plans.  The Health Maintenance Act of 1973 required
employers to give employees the option of joining a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) if one
were locally available (Beam & McFadden, 1996).  More recently, legislation requiring unpaid leave
for family medical needs and portable health insurance has increased the pressure on employers to
become more flexible.  Hence, the strength of legal pressures to introduce flexibility into benefits
programs seems to be increasing.2
Decisions about the design of flexible benefits may also be affected by coercive
governmental pressures.  Concerned about the potential loss of tax revenues resulting from pre-tax
contributions to flexible spending accounts, the federal government established the “use it lose it
rule” in 1984.  The rule had the effect of limiting employee use of these accounts by requiring that
any money left in the funds at the end of the enrollment period be forfeited.  1989 legislation further
discouraged employers from offering flexible spending accounts by requiring them to make
available at the beginning of the enrollment period the full amount of the yearly contribution election,
even if employees had not yet made the full amount of the contributions to the account.
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Changes in legislative pressures are not necessarily related to changes in management’s
decisions about the adoption and design of flexible benefit plans.  As Tolbert and Zucker (1983)
pointed out, strong resistance can lead to noncompliance with unpopular legislation (e.g., mandated
integration of public schools).  Further, the resource dependence model suggests that, rather than
passively conforming to such pressures, organizations will attempt to actively manage them
wherever feasible and desirable (Oliver, 1991).  Indeed, Section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which created complicated nondiscrimination rules for all employer benefit plans, was repealed just
three years after its passage, following objections that the rules were too difficult and costly to
implement (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1991).  Evidence suggests, however, that
organizations have generally been responsive to changes in legislation pertaining to flexible
benefits.  In 1984, the year the federal government issued regulations clarifying the terms and
restrictions on flexible benefit plans set out by section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, new
adoptions of the plans increased by 127%.  Based on theory and evidence then, we predict that,
Proposition 3a:  The rate of increase in new adoptions of flexible plans will be highest
around the introduction of favorable legislation.
Proposition 3b:  The variety of plan designs will be responsive to favorable legislation.
Expected Efficiency Gains
Insights regarding the effects of efficiency concerns on decisions about flexible benefit plans
are offered by all four theoretical perspectives.  Under the institutional model efficiency is only
expected to play an important role during the early, pre-institutionalization stage, when the
incidence of the plans is low and adoption decisions “depend on the degree to which the change
improves internal process” (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983:  26).  The resource dependence model implies
that organizations adopt total compensation systems that will ensure the flow of critical resources
(Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987; Balkin & Bannister, 1993).  The agency model suggests that
organizations adopt compensation structures that will reduce shirking where productivity is difficult
and/or costly to monitor (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Under the transaction cost model, organizations
theoretically use compensation systems both to reduce shirking where productivity is difficult to
monitor and to reduce costly turnover among employees who have received firm-specific training
(Williamson, 1981).
Antecedents of expected efficiency gains:  Benefits objectives.  The institutional
perspective assumes that during the pre-institutionalization years of flexible benefit plan adoption,
when external pressures are weak, management makes decisions about the plans based on their
expected impact on technical operations.  Hence, organizations would only be likely to adopt
flexible plans during this stage if the promised outcomes (enhanced benefits satisfaction, cost
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containment) were (a) important to the effectiveness of the organization’s benefits plan, and (b)
likely to be achieved.  Adoption decisions should therefore be determined, at least in part, by the
organization’s benefits objectives.  Similarly, the particular type of design implemented should be
logically related to the achievement of plan objectives.  The assumption under the resource
dependence, agency and transaction cost perspectives that organizational interest and agency play
an important role in determining structures also implies that decisions about flexible plans will be
rationally related to benefits objectives.  Predicting decisions about the plans therefore requires
information about organizations’ benefits objectives.
Although the institutional model implies that decisions about flexible plans during the early
stage will be influenced by benefits objectives, the model’s focus is primarily on explaining
environmental constraints on decisions during the later stages.  Insights into the particular factors
that constrain the setting of benefits objectives are more readily derived from the resource
dependence, agency and transaction cost models.  Together, these three perspectives suggest two
sets of factors affecting organizations’ benefits objectives: labor market conditions and the nature of
the work.
Theoretically, the nature of the work affects the value of employees and the ease of
monitoring their productivity.  Under the resource dependence model, attributes of the work affect
the extent to which organizations are dependent on employees for the acquisition and/or efficient
use of critical resources (Bartol & Martin, 1988).  Where resource dependency is high,
organizations will emphasize satisfaction objectives as a means of attracting and retaining critical
employees (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987; Balkin & Bannister, 1993).  Bartol and Martin (1988)
identified four work attributes that affect employee control over critical resources: the degree of
uncertainty surrounding the achievement of tasks, the importance of task achievement to the
organization (task centrality), the ease with which the work can be observed and measured, and the
level of skill specialization required to achieve tasks (B rtol & Martin, 1988).  Such conditions might
be found in the research and development division of a high-tech company, where creative efforts
related to product development can be difficult to monitor, specialized skills required to perform the
work can be difficult to replace, and the development of innovative products is central to the
company’s success (Bartol & Martin, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989).  We propose a fifth factor: the extent
to which the technology is labor versus capital intensive.  Where human resource inputs represent
a relatively small part of the production process, operations can continue even when these inputs
are withdrawn.  Accordingly, capital-intensive organizations (e.g., oil, chemical), although
dependent on workers with discretionary control over resources, are relatively less so than more
labor-intensive organizations (e.g., service).3
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The agency model implies that benefits satisfaction will take precedence over cost
containment objectives where organizations face both high monitoring costs and high outcome
uncertainty.  Under these conditions, behavior-based contracts provide limited incentives for self-
interested agents to act on behalf of the principal, and outcome-based contracts inefficiently
allocate risks to risk-averse agents.  Alternatively, under a behavior-based/efficiency wage
approach, compensation is tied not to outcomes but to continued employment, the desirability of
which is increased by offering employees pay and benefits that they value (Nalb ntian, 1987).
Monitoring costs are reduced because employees do not want to risk losing their jobs (with the
valued benefits) and therefore have an incentive not to shirk even when they are not being closely
monitored (Calvo, 1987; Shepard, Clifton & Kruse, 1996).  Like the resource dependence model,
then, the agency model implies that where employee effort is difficult or costly to monitor,
organizations are likely to emphasize offering benefits systems that enhance employee satisfaction.
A key variable not suggested by the resource dependence or other models is outcome uncertainty,
i.e. the extent to which outcomes are affected by factors beyond employee effort and/or are difficult
to measure.  To illustrate, consider consulting firms, where professionals with specialized
knowledge may be difficult to monitor, and outcomes are affected by factors beyond the
consultant’s control.  When management in such organizations decides to implement flexible
benefits, the aim is more likely to be enhancing employee satisfaction.
The ease of monitoring productivity emerges as a key work attribute explaining
organizations’ benefits objectives under the transaction cost model as well.  When monitoring is
difficult the potential for opportunistic behavior is high.  The assumption is that employees are not
apt to work hard if they believe that lower effort is unlikely to result in any negative consequences.
Incentives for employees to act in the interests of the organization are in many cases provided by
tying the employee’s pay to organization or individual performance.  Kalleb rg and Reve (1993),
however, argue that “in an economic sense, incentives are the price vector of the contract, and
include pay, bonuses, and fringe benefits.”  As with the resource dependence and agency models,
this implies that the “price” of employment, hence the cost of losing it, affects employees’ propensity
to act in the interest of the organization.
A second attribute of work under the transaction cost model, one not specified by other
models, is the extent to which skills required to achieve the work are acquired on the job (human
asset specificity).  Where critical skills specific to the organization are acquired primarily on the job,
costly investments in training can be lost if workers quit before the expected productivity gains are
fully realized.  Examples of such organizations might include consulting firms, law firms and
financial brokerage firms, where revenue creation is linked to building relationships among clients.
A Theoretical Exploration WP 97-22
Page 6
In these circumstances, internal governance structures will be efficient if they stabilize employment.
Benefits that accrue with seniority, for example, would discourage quitting (Williamson, 1981).
Indeed, many flexible plans include a provision that the allocation of credits for purchasing benefits
will increase with seniority (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1991).  Compensation packages
that include pay or benefits that exceed what employees could obtain elsewhere would also
discourage quitting.  Hence, where critical skills are firm-specific and/or monitoring performance is
difficult, organizations may try to minimize their transaction costs by offering total compensation
packages that enhance the value of continued employment, thereby discouraging quitting or
shirking.  In this case, benefits objectives would emphasize employee satisfaction.
Labor market conditions theoretically affect the extent to which an organization is
dependent on external agents for critical human resources.  As noted earlier, unions that control the
supply of labor to an organization can directly influence decisions about flexible benefit plans.  At
the same time, non-unionized organizations in industries where membership is high might seek to
avoid union involvement by emphasizing employee satisfaction objectives and reducing workers’
felt need for collective representation.  Hence, the percent of union members in an organization’s
labor market may help explain benefits objectives.  Conditions in the labor market also determine
the ease with which critical skills can be replaced.  Replaceability, as indicated by such labor
market conditions as unemployment rates, theoretically affects organizational dependence on
employees’ resources and hence the importance of satisfying benefits preferences (Ba tol & Martin,
1988).
To summarize, an organization’s benefits objectives can be explained, at least in part, by a
set of variables describing internal work attributes and external labor market conditions.  Where the
work is such that the opportunities for self-interested or opportunistic behavior are high, and/or
employee control over critical resources is high, organizations will tend to emphasize benefits
satisfaction over cost control. Satisfaction is also likely to be the primary objective where union
involvement is high, and/or there is a shortage of critical skills in the labor market.  Organizations
facing relatively less pressure from these conditions are less likely to be concerned with providing a
valuable benefits plan, and more likely to focus on cost containment objectives.4
Of course, not all organizations whose primary benefits objective is employee satisfaction
are going to adopt flexible benefits.  Evidence suggests that employees’ reactions to the plans vary,
perhaps because the enrollment procedures are seen by some as confusing and time-consuming
(Kossek, 1989).  Nor can organizations always expect to achieve cost containment objectives by
adopting flexible benefit plans.  The costs of implementing the plans can be high, and possibly
outweigh potential cost savings.  We posit that the effect of benefits objectives on decisions about
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flexible plan adoption will be moderated by current (non-flexible) benefit plan costs, flexible plan
implementation and administration costs (plan costs) and employee preferences.
Organizations whose primary objective is cost control are unlikely to adopt flexible benefits if
the administrative costs of the plans are high relative to the expected returns.  Small organizations,
and/or organizations without established information systems, would be less likely to have the
resources to cost-effectively implement and manage flexible benefit plans than would larger
organizations, particularly in the early years of adoption, when software packages simplifying
program administration were not yet available (Lawler, 1981).  On the other hand, organizations
with generous benefits such as first-dollar medical coverage (i.e., no deductible or coinsurance)
might expect to contain the rising costs of benefits by moving from a defined benefit to a defined
contribution arrangement, as often occurs with the introduction of flexible benefit plans.
Proposition 4a:  Among organizations whose primary benefits objective is cost control, the
propensity to adopt flexible benefit plans will be positively related to the munificence of
current (non-flexible) benefits.
Proposition 4b:  Among organizations whose primary benefits objective is cost control, the
propensity to adopt flexible benefit plans will be positively related to organizational
resources (as indicated by size and current information systems).
Organizations may expect flexible plans to enhance benefits satisfaction when its workforce
is highly diverse (in terms of gender, ethnicity, age). Whether these organizations actually enhance
satisfaction by adopting flexible benefits is unclear.  In a study of employees’ reactions to the
introduction of a flexible benefit plan, Barber et al. (1992: 59, 62) found no significant relationships
between satisfaction with the plan and “divergence from the traditional profile” (i.e., “long-tenure,
married males with children and nonworking spouses”).  Nevertheless, survey evidence clearly
suggests that employers believe that adopting flexible benefits will enhance the benefits satisfaction
of a diverse workforce (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1995; Hewitt, 1995).  Organizations
may also expect flexible benefit plans to increase the benefits satisfaction of employees who are
relatively well educated if, as Lawler (1981; 1990) has argued, such employees prefer to be
involved in making decisions that affect them.  It may also be that employees in the higher income
tax brackets are attracted to flexible plans because of options (such as flexible spending accounts)
that provide a tax shelter for cash earnings.  Hence, we predict that,
Proposition 5:  Among organizations whose primary benefit objective is employee
satisfaction, the propensity to adopt a flexible benefit plan will be positively related to the
diversity, education and income level of the work force.
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The assumption that expectations about efficiency gains drive decisions about flexible
benefits implies the plans will be designed in accordance with benefits objectives.  Thus, we would
expect programs implemented primarily to meet the diverse benefits needs of a heterogeneous
work force to offer more flexibility to employees in selecting their benefits.  As Table 1 indicates,
plan designs that provide the most choices, or flexibility, are the Core + Optional Coverage and Mix
& Match plans.  Organizations emphasizing employee satisfaction are more likely to implement
these plan designs rather than the Modular Options plan, which limits choices to pre-packaged
plans, or the Salary-Reduction-Only plan, which simply offers the opportunity to pay for pre-
determined benefits with pre-tax dollars.  Therefore, we predict that
Proposition 6:  Organizations whose primary benefit objective at the time of flexible benefit
plan adoption is employee satisfaction are more likely to offer the Core + Optional Coverage
or Mix and Match plan, than are organizations that emphasize cost control.
Organizations emphasizing cost containment objectives, on the other hand, are unlikely to
offer a lot of choices.  Administrative costs could be minimized by offering the Salary-Reduction-
Only or Modular Options plans, which offer less flexibility and are therefore less costly to implement,
communicate and manage (Beam & McFadden, 1996).  These organizations might also be less
likely to offer flexible spending accounts, because allowing employees to pay insurance premiums
and uncovered medical expenses with pre-tax dollars essentially reduces the cost to workers of
medical care and hence their incentive to use it carefully.  Hence,
Proposition 7:  Organizations whose primary benefit objective at the time of flexible benefit
plan adoption is cost control are more likely to offer the Modular Options or Salary-
Reduction-Only plan, than are organizations that emphasize employee satisfaction.
The Relative Strength of Institutional Pressures and Expected Efficiency Gains
Although institutional and “efficiency” perspectives offer complementary rationales for
decisions about flexible benefit plans, these two factors may also generate conflicting pressures on
managers.  According to the institutional view, organizations may often adopt structures that do not
improve efficiency but do conform to prevailing practice (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  We suggest that
the relative strength of the two factors will depend on three conditions:  (1) The stage of
institutionalization of flexible practices affects the strength of institutional pressures.  During the pre-
institutionalization stage, when few organizations have adopted these plans, pressures to adopt
and design in specific ways are weak.  Hence, these decisions depend on economic and technical
issues.  As more organizations adopt, the pressures to conform to prevailing practices become
stronger.  According to this logic, the economic efficiency rationales become less important or are
maybe assumed by managers (If these leading companies are doing it, so should I).  (2)
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Organizations may vary in their desire to resist the pressures.  That is, if flexible benefit plans are
expected to generate minimal, or negative, efficiency gains, managers may decide they should try
to resist any pressures to adopt or design in a certain way (Oliver, 1991).  Where the plans are too
costly, and the organization is trying to contain costs, or unappealing to employees, and the
organization is trying to enhance benefits objectives, the desire to resist is likely to be high.  (3)
Organizations vary in their ability to resist institutional pressures.  According to institutional and
resource dependence theorists, differences in ability to resist are related to differences in
organizational interconnectedness, uncertainty about goals or technology, and organizational size
(Greening & Gray, 1994).  Interconnectedness, also referred to as profes ionalization of managerial
staff, is “the density of interorganizational relations among occupants of an organizational field”
(Oliver, 1991: 171)  The idea is that organizations managed primarily by professionals, or others
belonging to interorganizational groups, will be heavily influenced by standard-setting academic
institutions or professional networks, and will therefore tend to adopt the prevailing human resource
practices in their field.  In these circumstances, the collective strength of the pressures make them
more difficult to resist (Oliver, 1991).  Interconnectedness is likely to be observed in industries that
have a lot of business, trade or professional organizations (Go dstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons,
1995), such as service (consulting, health care, etc.) and high technology.  Professional
organizations such as the American Compensation Association, or the Society of Human Resource
Management, tend to emphasize “leading edge” practices.  Benchmarking other organizations’
“best” practices is another example of how interconnectedness is manifested in practice.
Uncertainty about goals or technologies theoretically induces organizations to imitate the practices
of other organizations that are perceived as successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987;
Oliver, 1991).  Organizations in high-technology industries, or health care, for example, often
operate in highly uncertain environments.  Finally, the scale and resources of an organization, and
hence its ability to resist institutional pressures, are related to its size (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;
Greening & Gray, 1994).  We therefore predict that
Proposition 8:  The relationship between efficiency-related factors (benefits objectives,
labor market conditions, nature of the work, current benefits costs, flexible plan costs, and
employee preferences) and management’s decisions about flexible plans will be stronger
during the pre-institutionalization than the semi- and full-institutionalization stages.
Proposition 9:  The relationship between institutional pressures and management’s flexible
benefit decisions will be stronger when conformity with the pressures (e.g., to adopt flexible
benefits) does not conflict with cost containment or benefits satisfaction objectives.
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Proposition 10:  The relationship between institutional pressures and management’s
flexible benefit decisions will be stronger among small organizations, or organizations
where uncertainty or interconnectedness is high.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our purpose was to analyze and integrate four theoretical explanations of why organizations
adopt flexible benefits and why such variety in plan designs exists.  We generalized the theories
into two primary foci -- institutional pressures and expected efficiency gains -- that i fluence both
adoption and design decisions.  As our integrated model demonstrates, further analysis of these
decisions through the four theoretic lenses suggests sets of specific variables that must be included
when studying management’s flexible benefit decisions.  Institutional pressures are contingent upon
competitors’ pressures and coercive forces such as legislation and unions.  The expected efficiency
gains are a function of plan objectives, which are in turn affected by labor market conditions, the
nature of the work, employee preferences, and costs.  The relative strength of institutional versus
efficiency factors is moderated by the stage of institutionalization, as well as factors related to the
organization’s resistance to institutional pressures.
Application to Other Human Resource Innovations
Generalizing the insights gained from exploring a specific HR innovation -- flexible benefits --
to questions surrounding decisions about other innovations remains to be demonstrated.  We
believe that our analysis of the four theories and related research provides a useful framework for
such efforts.  Further, we submit that our integrated model offers insights into the decisions
management makes about other HR innovations.  Our model may have limited generalizability
when it comes to some of the moderating factors such as workforce diversity, which may be unique
to flexible benefits, however even these variables offer a platform for future work.
Consider the case of self-managed work teams.  Our model implies that explanations for
observed patterns of team implementations must include an examination of the institutional
pressures related to teams.  Considering first competitors’ practices, we find that adoptions of this
innovative practice have in recent years increased substantially among manufacturing firms
(Osterman, 1994; Banker, Field, Schroeder & Sinha, 1996; Cohen, Ledford & Spreitzer, 1996).
This trend suggests that competitors’ practices in the manufacturing sector will generate strong
institutional pressures favoring the adoption of the team approach.  Hence, new team
implementations are likely to be higher in this sector than in other sectors where the approach is
less prevalent.  At the same time, many unions oppose the adoption of teams, which they view as
undermining the role of unions in representing workers (Kochan, Katz & McKersie, 1994).  The
National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits organizations from forming company unions, has
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recently been invoked by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to bar certain types of teams
in nonunion settings (Flynn, 1996).  Consequently, in settings that are currently unionized and/or in
settings where unions are attempting to organize workers, coercive legislative and union forces
generate institutional pressures on organizations not to adopt a team approach.  Variability in the
strength of these pressures may help explain adoption patterns over time.  Soon after the NLRB
issued its first ruling against the use of teams, many organizations backed away from employee
involvement initiatives or modified existing teams to be in compliance with the ruling (Flynn, 1996).
However, a bill recently introduced in the U.S. Congress loosens the restrictions on teams (the
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act), reflecting a current political climate that favors the
use of innovative approaches to work design (DeWine, 1997).
Decisions about structures such as teams will also, according to our model, be influenced by
the efficiency gains organizations can expect to realize by adopting them.  Indeed, survey evidence
indicates that organizations implementing teams do so in the hopes of achieving gains in
productivity, quality, costs, and employee satisfaction (Lawler, Mohrman & Ledford, 1992).  A key
determinant of expected efficiency gains in the case of flexible benefit plans is benefits objectives.
This factor is clearly not relevant to decisions about teams, however a closely related factor --
human resource objectives -- might prove a useful substitute.  Whether the primary objective in
implementing teams is reducing production costs or enhancing employee satisfaction will in turn be
influenced by the nature of the work and labor market conditions, as posited in our discussion
(above) of the model.  Organizations that depend on employees with specialized skills that are in
short supply in the labor market, for example, would tend to emphasize employee satisfaction.
As our integrated model suggests, the impact of objectives on organizations’ expectations
about efficiency gains will depend on moderating factors.  In the case of flexible benefits, these
include costs and employee preferences.  Employee preferences for flexible benefits are
theoretically related to workforce diversity and education.  Employee preferences will also affect the
capacity of teams to achieve objectives, however the literature suggests a different set of indicators.
Hackman and Oldham (1980) suggest that a team design will not lead to performance and
satisfaction improvements if workers do not have a strong growth need.  Lawler (1986) argues that
needs for growth, achievement, competence, and social interaction are important.  Contextual
factors will also affect the extent to which teams can be expected to help achieve human resource
objectives.  Specifically, teams may be most successful in contexts where production tasks are
interdependent and/or in “greenfield” sites (Lawler, 1986; Campion, Medsker & Higgs, 1993).
As with flexible benefits, the relative influence of institutional pressures versus expected
efficiency gains on management’s decisions about teams will depend on the stage of
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institutionalization as well as the organization’s ability and/or desire to resist institutional pressures.
Factors related to the efficiency gains organizations can expect to achieve by adopting teams will
exert more of an influence during the pre-institutionalization stage.  During the semi- and full-
institutionalization stages, organizational uncertainty, interconnectedness and size will affect the
ability to resist pressures to adopt (or not adopt) teams.  Finally, the desire to resist these pressures
in the later stages of institutionalization will depend on whether the adoption of teams is consistent
with the organization’s objectives.  Organizations with a long tradition of individual-based work have
found that the introduction of teams can lead to employee discontent, making the achievement of
employee satisfaction objectives difficult (Lawler, 1986).
The discussion above suggests that many of the factors posited to affect decisions about
flexible benefit plans can also be applied to decisions about other HR innovations.  The applicability
of institutional pressures, expected efficiency gains, labor market conditions, employee
preferences, and the nature of the work appears to go beyond the specific case of flexible benefits.
Other factors may vary somewhat across contexts.  Benefits objectives are only an appropriate
factor when considering benefits innovations.  Nonetheless, there are a number of such innovations
for which this factor is appropriate, for example work-family benefits, or wellness programs.
Further, we suggest that a closely related factor -- human resource objectives -- can be easily
substituted into the model.  Although we suggest that employee preferences moderate the effect of
objectives on expected efficiency gains, we also argue that the relevant indicators of preferences
vary across innovations.  Finally, it may be appropriate to consider moderators other than costs and
employee preferences when explaining other types of innovative practices (e.g., employees’ growth
needs in the case of teams).
Implications for Theory and Research
The integrated model we propose represents the first attempt that we can find at synthesizing
the implications of these four leading theories for decisions about organization structures.  As we
noted, others have integrated two theories (e.g., institutional and resource dependence, institutional
and agency), but ours is the first to draw insights from all four.  Arguably, integrating four theories to
better understand organizational behavior yields a more parsimonious model.  Empirical studies of
our model will provide tests of its efficacy in explaining management decisions about flexible
benefits.  As we noted, very little is known about flexible benefit decisions at the organizational level
of analysis.  Our intent is to support organization scholars in the use of multiple theories in their
study of employee benefits and, by implication, other HR innovations.
We should note that many of the explanatory factors included in our model may be
endogenous.  For example, the model implies that workforce diversity is a determinant of the
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decision to adoption flexible plans.  But it may also be true that the presence of flexible plans affects
the diversity of workers who seek employment at an organization.  Similarly, the resource
dependence, agency and transaction cost models all suggest that inadequate information about
work effort will cause organizations to increase the value of their total compensation packages.  At
the same time, the level of overall compensation may influence employees’ willingness to share
information about their work effort.  Empirically sound tests of the model may therefore require the
estimation of simultaneous equations.
Implications for Practice
Although our purposes did not include an applied focus, we believe that managers may also
gain insight from our model and analysis.  The model clearly delineates the principal factors that
leading theories specify influence whether and why types of flexible plans are adopted.  It focuses
managers’ attention on both institutional reasons (based on benchmarking, following competitors,
regulatory pressures) as well as expected economic gains.  Experience suggests that although the
rhetoric around adopting many HR innovations is expressed in terms of expected economic gains,
the reality may be that government regulations as well as fads and fashions prevail (Dyer &
Reeves, 1995).  Our model calls out for the first time, in one integrated guide, very specific factors
managers could consider when faced with decisions about whether or not to adopt flexible plans or
what type of plan design to implement (Rosenbloom, 1996).
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ENDNOTES
1 When referring to decisions to adopt and design flexible plans we mean those organizational
decisions made by top-level management.  For simplicity we use the term “management’s
decisions” in the article.
2 Many of the ideas about the effects of governmental legislation are based on comments from
an anonymous reviewer.
3 Industry examples such as these are used for the purpose of illustration only.  Empirical tests
of our model would require direct measurement of variables such as task uncertainty rather than
the use of proxies such as industry.
4 Obviously, organizations typically claim multiple benefits objectives, which include both employee
satisfaction and cost containment (Beam & McFadden, 1996).  Nevertheless, survey evidence
suggests that organizations prioritize their objectives and easily specify a single, primary objective
behind their decisions to adopt practices such as flexible plans.  In a 1992 survey, 52% of the
participating firms indicated their primary reason for implementing flexible benefits was health
benefits cost containment, and 28% indicated the primary objective was to satisfy diverse employee
needs (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1995).  Our analysis suggests that the primary
objective will be more helpful than secondary objectives in explaining management’s decisions
about flexible benefit plans.
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